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Public Housing in Singapore: Interpreting
`Quality’ in the 1990s
Teo Siew Eng and Lily Kong
{Paper ® rst received, April 1996; in ® nal form, August 1996}
Summary. While writings exist on variou s aspects of public housing in Singapore, recent
developments in the 1990s have not yet been given any seriou s academic attention. Our intention
in this paper is to focus on such developments, paying particu lar attention to the government’ s
policy of provid ing quality housing. After setting the context of efforts at provid ing quality in the
® rst three decades of public housing by the Housing and Development Board , we turn our
attention speci® cally to the 1990s, focusing on three areas in which attempts are being made to
improve quality, namely, the physical upgrading of older estates, the privatisa tion of HUDC ¯ ats,
and the invention of new schemes such as the execu tive condominium concept. In the ® nal section ,
we argue that, as in earlier decades, such efforts belie a hegemonic intent, essentially to manage
Singaporeans’ growing aspiration s and thus to gain political legitimacy for the government. This
we term the ` politics of quality’ in public housing. We then discuss brie¯ y some reaction s to such
attempts at hegemony.
Introduction
By comparison with many other large cities
in the world, modern public housing in Sin-
gapore has achieved impressive results. From
old, badly degenerated, overcrowded slums,
characterised by, inter alia , poor sanitation
and lack of hygiene, high-rise public ¯ ats of
varied designs and sizes now characterise the
skyline. Whereas tuberculosis was rife and
buildings posed ® re hazards, Singaporeans
today enjoy high standards of public hygiene
and safety as well as numerous luxurie s in
high-quality housing symbolic of modernity.
These changes in the housing landscape
have taken place over a short period of time.
Up to the 1950s and early 1960s, Singapore
was still plagued by the varied problems
outlined above. Kaye (1960, p. 5), for exam-
ple, documented the living conditions of a
typical street in Chinatown in 1954, describ-
ing it as ª among the most primitive in the
urban areas of the worldº . Goh (1956) simi-
larly found in a study conducted in 1953±54,
that 73 per cent of surveyed households lived
in badly overcrowded condition s. In another
estimate, it was suggested that in 1960 one
quarter of a million people lived in badly
degenerated slums in the city centre and
another one-third of a million lived in squat-
ter areas on the city fringe (Teh, 1975, p. 5).
This is signi® cant, considering that in 1960,
the total population was only 1.6m (Depart-
ment of Statistics, 1983).
Given the severe shortage of decent hous-
ing in that period, the Housing and Develop-
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ment Board (HDB) was established in 1960,
replacing its predecessor, the Singapore Im-
provement Trust,
1
tasked with the job of
housing Singaporeans. The HDB’ s top prior-
ity was to build as many housing units as
possible within a short time. By the end of its
First Five-Year Plan in 1965, the HDB had
exceeded its construction target of 50 000
units by 5000 and was able to house 23 per
cent of the total population in public ¯ ats.
However, while the targets pertaining to
quantity had been satis® ed, the ¯ ats were
very basic in nature, and little attention was
paid to quality . Indeed, many were one-room
` emergency’ ¯ ats, each with a kitchen, a
toile t-cum-bathroom , and a room which
served simultaneously as bedroom and living
room (HDB, 1961, p. 3). By its Second Five-
Year Plan (1966±70), however, the HDB’ s
success in meeting its quantitative targets
meant that it could now pay a little more
attention to quality , a direction that has per-
sisted and indeed become most important
today.
While writings exist on various aspects of
public housing in Singapore (see, for exam-
ple, Teh, 1975; Teo and Savage, 1985; Wong
and Yeh, 1985; Teo, 1986; Tai, 1988; Pugh,
1989; Castells et al., 1990; Ooi et al., 1993;
and Chua, 1995), recent developments in the
1990s which deserve documentation and
analysis have not yet been given any serious
attention. It is our intention in this paper to
focus on the complexion of public housing in
Singapore in the 1990s, paying particular
attention to the government’ s policy of pro-
viding quality housing. In the next section,
we will present the context by outlining in
brief the varied ways in which attention has
been paid to quality in the ® rst three decades
of public housing under the HDB in Singa-
pore. We will then turn our attention
speci® cally to the 1990s, focusing on three
areas in which attempts are being made to
improve quality. In the ® nal section, we will
argue that, as in earlier decades, such efforts
belie a hegemonic intent, essentially to man-
age Singaporeans’ growing aspirations and
thus gain political legitimacy for the govern-
ment. This we term the ` politic s of quality’ in
public housing . We will then discuss brie¯ y
some reactions to such attempts at hege-
mony.
Improving Quality in Public Housing: The
First Three Decades
In the late 1960s, when the HDB began to
pay heed to the need to improve the quality
of its ¯ ats, its strategy was to build bigger
units, replacing the minimalist one-room
` emergency’ ¯ ats of the early 1960s when
the motiva tional force was purely to meet
quantitative targets (see Teh, 1975). Atten-
tion in the latter part of the 1960s was also
paid to the living environment in toto, be-
yond the focus on the housing units per se.
For example, greater emphasis was placed on
the provision of open spaces, landscaping,
car park facilities and recreational facilities
such as playgrounds and sports facilities.
In the 1970s, attention to quality took the
shape of even bigger and better designed ¯ ats
in more attractive locations, as well as good
infrastructural support in the form of ef® cient
transport, adequate retail and recreational fa-
cilities and other amenities (Teo, 1986). At
the same time, architectural variations were
introduced in the design of the ¯ ats, thus
creating more attractive external designs. By
the late 1970s, providing a housing environ-
ment of quality also meant encouraging an
environment of neighbourliness and friendli-
ness through the setting up of Residents’
Committees, and the continued support given
to community centre activities. Both were
geared towards organising activities for
residents, including social and recreational
programmes (such as excursions and get-
together parties) and educational ones (such
as forums and exhibitions).
Between the late 1970s and 1980s, exist-
ing estates were also upgraded on an ad hoc
basis as part of the effort to improve quality.
Such upgrading took place along four lines.
First, old ¯ ats were demolished so that land
could be made available for redevelopment.
Second, old one-room ¯ ats were converted
into larger three- and four-room self-con-
tained ¯ ats by knocking down the walls be-
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tween the old ¯ ats. Third, part of the up-
grading also entailed the provision of addi-
tional facilities for the older estates so as to
ensure that they too had a share of better
facilities such as those found in the newer
estates. At the estate level, for example, Toa
Payoh estate was provided with a commer-
cial complex with fast-food restaurants and
of® ces, a new bus interchange, the Mass
Rapid Transit line stopping in the town cen-
tre, and the ® rst government mini-hospital
of 40 beds. At the level of individual build-
ings and units, new lifts were added; case-
ment windows were installed to existing
¯ ats with open balconies; central television
antennae were added; and rewiring and
reroo® ng took place (HDB, 1979/80, pp. 6±
7). Fourth, as part of the effort to improve
old estates, rules on ¯ at alterations were
liberalised. Owners were allowed to make
minor alterations themselves. For example,
owners of ® ve-room ¯ ats were allowed to
install windows in their open balconies; res-
idents on ground ¯ oors were permitted to
extend their courtyard shelters to keep out
the rain (The Straits Times, 3March 1988, 6
January 1990); the space in recessed en-
trances and along common corridors could
also be sold so that residents could turn
them into mini-gardens or playgrounds and
have improved security and privacy (The
Straits Times, 25 February 1989).
Throughout the 1980s, to improve the
quality of life in public housing estates, the
HDB sought to promote new town character
and community identity through the use of
new building designs, in which different
building heights were combined to break the
monotony of the skyline. Greater use was
also made of traditional features such as the
pitched roofs, overhanging eaves and tall
windows typical of a tropical building. In
addition, the precinct concept, initiated in
1978, was further encouraged in the 1980s.
Each precinct, consisting of 600±1000 dwell-
ing units, and linked to other precincts by
pedestrian paths, is meant to encourage
meaningful social interaction among resi-
dents. The idea is to try to create a com-
munity activity focal point in the form of a
landscape square with recreational facilities,
kindergarten, eating places and local shops
among a cluster of blocks. Precincts are also
made more compact with closer spacing be-
tween building s so as to enhance a sense of
community spirit and neighbourliness.
`Quality’ in the 1990s
While the HDB certainly directed resources
and energy towards improving the quality of
housing and the quality of life in new towns
in the ® rst three decades, at no point has this
been more apparent than in the 1990s where
speci® c emphasis is placed on quality and
service. In this regard, a variety of measures
have been taken, such as efforts to improve
older existing estates through, for example,
upgrading individual units and blocks of ¯ ats
as well as entire estates; the introduction of
new schemes, namely, executive condom ini-
ums and housing cooperatives, and new de-
sign ¯ ats; and the privatisation of Housing
and Urban Development Corpora tion
(HUDC)
2
estates. In what follows, we will
outline details of each policy, leaving the
analysis and interpretation of intention and
response to the ® nal section.
Improving Older Existing HDB Estates
Attempts to improve existing HDB estates in
the 1990s take a variety of forms. There are
the government’ s formal upgrading pro-
gramme, individual town council efforts to
improve common facilities, the Selective En
Bloc Redevelopment Scheme and govern-
ment efforts to redevelop selected town cen-
tres. We will elaborate on each in turn.
In July 1989, the government announced a
formal, large-scale S$15bn programme to
upgrade existing HDB estates with the aim to
ª bring about a complete change in the per-
ception of public housing º (S. Dhanabalan,
quoted in The Straits Times, 12 July 1989).
The project was to last 15 years and would
affect 95 per cent of HDB dwellers (Business
Times, 12 July 1989). Other than the scale of
the programme, this plan differed from pre-
vious upgrading schemes because it did not
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require existing residents to relocate or pur-
chase another dwelling elsewhere. In fact,
upgrading was to proceed while owners were
still living in the ¯ ats.
In formulating the HDB upgrading pro-
gramme, the government hoped to retain the
popula tion, especially the younger segment,
in the older estates. This was deemed a prior-
ity, given the government’ s concern about
the social and economic consequences of an
ageing population in established estates like
Toa Payoh and Tiong Bahru (The Straits
Times, 8 May 1989). For example, in 1970,
Toa Payoh had 3405 births but by 1987, the
number of births had dropped to only 148. In
contrast, a newer outlying estate like Yishun
New Town reported 3461 births in 1987, up
from only 495 in 1980 (The Straits Times, 8
May 1989). It was feared that the smaller and
older population in the older estates would
depress consumption and force shops and
other businesses to move out. Schools and
other social amenities demanded by a
younger population would also be under-
utilised. Upgrading the physical environment
was thus a way to stem the ¯ ow of younger
people to the newer new towns like
Tampines and Pasir Ris with their better
facilities (The Straits Times, 24 July 1989).
At the same time, there was another ex-
pected spin-off from the upgrading pro-
gramme in that it provided a constant stream
of work for the construction industry that
would, also, require architects and other de-
signers to acquire a new level of expertise
(The Straits Times, 20 October 1989).
The upgrading programme incorpora tes
three main components of development. The
® rst involves the creation of precincts con-
sisting of distinc t groupings of ® ve to seven
blocks of ¯ ats. The idea is to allow each to
have a distinc tive appearance which will, in
turn, help to create small communities with a
sense of identity , ownership and belonging
(The Straits Times, 12 July 1989). This repre-
sents an improvement from past attempts at
precinct creation which lacked proper plan-
ning, and hence failed to achieve the desired
goals of precinct development (Teo, 1986).
Additiona lly, the upgrading includes the in-
jection of amenities like multi-storey car
parks, landscaped gardens and children’ s
playgrounds.
Second, at the block level, architectural
improvements are made to give each block
its own individuality. Lift lobbies and en-
trances are enclosed to improve security
while the designs of staircases and corridors
are also upgraded (The Straits Times, 12 July
1989).
The third aspect of upgrading concerns the
¯ at itself. For example, ¯ ats with only one
bathroom/toilet have an extra toilet or bath-
room installed in them. The kitchen area may
also be expanded in the upgrading process
(The Straits Times, 12 July 1989; Business
Times, 12 July 1989).
By March 1993, it was decided that resi-
dents would be offered a choice of any one
of three packages: basic, standard or stan-
dard-plus. In all three packages, improve-
ments to toilets are made and aluminium
windows provided. The difference between
the basic and standard packages lies in the
improvements to the block. The basic pack-
age only focuses on essentials like upgrading
of existing toilets but does not include, for
example, upgrading of building facË ades or
replacement of block numbers. The standard-
plus package gets an additiona l space-adding
item like an extra toilet (The Straits Times,
11 March 1993; Business Times, 11 March
1993).
In general, the upgrading process aims at
being as ¯ exible as possible, by allowing
residents and town councils to participate in
the decision-making process. Management of
the project is undertaken by the respective
town councils which, though guided by a set
of general principles, make their respective
decisions on the speci® c types and extent of
the upgrading work to be done (Business
Times, 20 October 1989). In any housing
estate targeted for upgrading, residents of the
individual precincts have the ® nal say with
regard to whether the upgrading works are to
proceed or not. Only when at least 75 per
cent of residents in a precinct agree to up-
grade will the improvements be implemented
(Business Times, 17 December 1989).
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An important consideration in deciding
whether to upgrade is the cost of the project
to HDB dwellers. From the onset, the
government had indicated that the project
was to be a joint venture between the Minis-
try for National Development and ¯ at-
owners (Business Times, 20 October 1989).
Initially, owners of three- and four-room ¯ ats
were to pay about 25 per cent of the total
upgrading costs, rising to 35 per cent for
those in the ® ve-room and executive ¯ ats.
Town councils were to bear 5 per cent of the
total upgrading costs (Business Times, 17
December 1989) while the government’ s
share was between 65 and 75 per cent (The
Straits Times, 16 December 1989). Soon af-
ter, the government announced that it would
absorb a greater percentage of the costs, in-
cluding paying the full costs of the ancillary
works, such as replacing lift cages and con-
structing ramps for the handicapped (The
Straits Times, 11 March 1993). Effectively,
¯ at-dwellers have to pay only 10±20 per cent
of the upgrading costs. The ratios were re-
vised in the light of feedback from residents
and Members of Parliament. However, bet-
ter-off residents who choose the standard-
plus package have to pay 40±80 per cent of
the costs, partly because of the high cost of
the space-adding item (The Straits Times, 11
March 1993).
To help residents with payment, the Minis-
try of National Development (MND, the
Ministry under which the HDB functions as
a statutory board) put together a package of
® nancial incentives. They include the use of
the residents’ Central Provident Fund (CPF)3
savings, which normally cannot be used for
renovation purposes, to repay the renovation
loans provided by the HDB. The loan is
extended at 0.1 per cent above the CPF
interest rate and repayment can be made over
10 years. Owners who have ® nancial
dif® culties are allowed to defer repayment,
with interest, until they sell their ¯ at or trans-
fer the lease to another owner. This option is
designed to remove any ® nancial obstacle
that may prevent the less well-off owners
from upgrading (The Straits Times, 16 De-
cember 1989).
The upgrading programme can broadly be
categorised into three phases of implemen-
tation: a pilot phase, a demonstration phase
and a main phase, each planned systemati-
cally to win residents’ support for the up-
grading programme. The pilot phase was
essentially to test out new materials and
methods so that upgrading could be carried
out with minimal disruptions to residents.
For this purpose , 4 vacant blocks totalling
480 units in Teban Gardens and Woodlands
were used. In order to simulate actual living
conditions that residents would have to un-
dergo during the upgrading process, several
families of employees of the HDB were re-
cruited to live in the ¯ ats (The Straits Times,
16 December 1989, 27 March 1991).
Follow ing the pilot phase, 6 precincts
(Marine Parade, Kim Keat, Lorong Lew
Lian, Telok Blangah, Ang Mo Kio and
Clementi) were picked for the demonstration
phase, involving a total of 6000 units (The
Straits Times, 4 February 1993). The estates
were selected on the basis of their locations,
being spread out in different parts of the
island and because they belonged to the older
estates built in the late 1960s and early
1970s. The intention of the demonstration
units was to help HDB residents to visualise
the overall effect of upgrading and to assist
them in the decision of whether or not to go
along with the upgrading scheme (The Straits
Times, 16 December 1989).
To increase the range of ideas on possible
upgrading design options , the government
farmed out three of the demonstration
precincts to private architects. The oppor-
tunity for private-sector participation was en-
thusiastically received by the Singapore
Institute of Architects, evident in the variety
of designs submitted to the HDB.
The main phase of the programme was
implemented in 1993 with the ® rst batch of
precincts (Bukit Merah, Bukit Ho Swee,
Queenstown, Kallang Airport, Boon Lay and
Balestier/St Michael’ s Estate) identi® ed for
upgrading (The Straits Times, 24 April 1993,
24 May 1993). Since then, a number of other
precincts have been earmarked. In the main
phase, the private sector also participated in
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the upgrading programme. Bukit Merah and
St Michael’ s Estate are examples of estates
that were upgraded based on designs pro-
duced by private architects (The Straits
Times, 24 May 1993).
In addition to the formal upgrading pro-
gramme, the HDB embarked on an interim
`mini’ upgrading programme of housing es-
tates between 10 and 15 years old (The
Straits Times, 12 February 1993). The in-
terim programme was deemed necessary as it
was estimated that the main upgrading pro-
gramme could take up to 20 years to reach
some estates. Interim upgrading is con® ned
to improving only the common areas of the
HDB estates while the main programme
would concentrate on the interiors of the ¯ ats
(The Straits Times, 14 February 1993). The
interim upgrading scheme is thus designed to
complement the main upgrading programme.
The formal upgrading programme, though
extensive in reach, is not the sole programme
in place to improve existing HDB estates in
the 1990s. By 1991, town councils of such
estates as Ang Mo Kio had also announced
plans to upgrade facilities and to improve the
physical environment in their HDB estates
(The Straits Times, 17 May 1991). Unlike the
more piecemeal nature of earlier plans, the
new plans gave estates a more upmarket and
user-friendly high-quality environment as a
whole . These plans, while complementing
the government’ s initiatives, also re¯ ected
the growing con® dence of town councils in
managing their estates (The Straits Times, 17
May 1991).
In 1995, plans were also announced for the
selective redevelopment of old blocks of
¯ ats. This is known as the Selective En Bloc
Redevelopment Scheme (Sers), which will
be applicable in some more mature estates in
the central area rather than in the outlying
new towns. The decision to redevelop selec-
tively lies with the Ministry of National De-
velopment and is not subject to voting in the
same way that upgrading is. At the same
time, unlike the upgrading scheme which
involve s improving existing blocks, in Sers,
some blocks will be completely redeveloped.
Residents would be compensated for their
old ¯ ats and guaranteed a new one at a 20
per cent discount in mature estates. As an
example of Sers, it was announced that 16
blocks of low-rise ¯ ats in Boon Tiong Road
in Tiong Bahru will be redeveloped. Al-
though there are many other similar old SIT
¯ ats in the vicinity, these were chosen be-
cause of the availability of empty plots of
land nearby on which the HDB can build
® rst. Residents can then move to these new
blocks before their old ¯ ats are demolished
and new ones built in place. In this way, the
physical living environment can be improved
without having to move residents out of the
area. The sense of community and rootedness
to place can thus still be retained.
Apart from Sers, it has also been proposed
that town centres of entire estates be redevel-
oped. These plans will also proceed without
being put to the vote . The decision to up-
grade will lie solely with the authorities, after
views are heard from residents and grass-
roots leaders. The ® rst plan to be unveiled in
this respect was a comprehensive strategy to
rejuvenate Toa Payoh town centre.
4
The plan,
to be realised within ® ve years from 1995,
includes the construction of a new S$700m
commercial complex with of® ce and retail
space and another of® ce block in the town
centre. It is also intended that pedestrian
malls in Toa Payoh Central will be im-
proved; new road linkages will be introduced
to improve access to Toa Payoh; and new
housing will be constructed on vacant state
land and land cleared when rental blocks are
freed of tenants. Two blocks of rental ¯ ats
with elderly residents will also be refur-
bished with new non-slip tiles, pedestal toi-
lets, hand-rails and alarm systems. At the
same time, three community centres in the
town will be upgraded (The Straits Times, 2
September 1995). After Toa Payoh, two new
towns built in the 1970s, Bedok and Ang Mo
Kio, will also be redeveloped.
Privatising HUDC Estates
As indicated earlier, the HUDC was set up in
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1974 to cater for the middle-income group.
This was a group that enjoyed a total house-
hold income exceeding the ceiling that would
qualify them for HDB ¯ ats,
5
yet found them-
selves priced out of the private housing mar-
ket. In order to cater to their needs,
HUDC-construc ted ¯ ats followed the condo-
minium concept, with maisonettes and ¯ ats
in an estate within which communal ameni-
ties such as children’ s playgrounds and out-
door ball courts are provided. At the time of
inception, the response was overwhelming,
largely because they were ª exclusive devel-
opments away from those sprawling HDB
look-alikes, and priced at a considerable dis-
count compared with private propertyº (The
Straits Times, 2 September 1995). The
HUDC merged with the HDB in 1982 while
construc tion of HUDC estates stopped in
1985 after 19 estates or 7750 units were
completed. This was due to a number of
reasons: the closing gap between sale prices
of HUDC ¯ ats and private property; im-
provements in HDB ¯ ats; and the raising of
HDB’ s income eligibility ceiling.
In 1986, several HUDC estates were al-
lowed to manage their own estates: Am-
berville, Braddell View, Chancery Court,
Farrer Court, Laguna Park and Lakeview,
although residents did not own the strata
titlesÐ that is, they did not own the common
areas.6 The rest of the 13 estates came under
the purview of the HDB. In 1995, it was
decided that residents in two HUDC estates,
Gillman Heights and Pine Grove, would be
given the option to privatise if at least 75 per
cent of owners in each estate voted for it.
Privatisation would allow leases of ¯ ats to be
converted to strata titles and owners would
own and manage the estates, including the
common property areas (The Straits Times,
25 May 1995). When voting took place,
both estates exceeded the necessary 75 per
cent of votes. After privatisation, residents
may decide how they wish to improve their
estates. Subsequently, it was announced
that four more estates would be privatised in
the next stage, namely, Farrer Park,
Lakeview, Hougang South and Jurong East,
and this would be followed up by yet others.
Inventing New Schemes
Another major development of the 1990s that
pays attention to improving Singaporeans’
quality of life through their housing environ-
ment is the introduction in 1995 of executive
condom iniums, meant to house a ` sandwich
class’ between HDB and private housing
(The Straits Times, 30 August 1995). The
schemes will approximate private condo-
miniums in that there will be facilities such
as a swimming pool or tennis court. The ® rst
540 units will be in Jurong East and Pasir
Ris. First-time buyers will be given a
S$40 000 grant but must ® nd their own
® nancing, whereas applicants for HDB ¯ ats
will have HDB ® nancing. Eighty per cent of
the units will be offered to those in the queue
for HDB executive ¯ ats (the upper range of
HDB ¯ ats) while the rest will be open to
others. Several restrictions must however be
observed. An executive condom inium owner
can never buy HDB ¯ ats directly from the
HDB. The ¯ ats must be occupied for ® ve
years before they can be sold to Singapore-
ans and permanent residents. Only after the
tenth year will they be fully privatised; the
ownership restriction will then be lifted. This
is to prevent speculators from buying execu-
tive condom iniums for investment.
In addition to executive condom iniums,
the HDB has also introduced another two
new schemes: Design and Build ¯ ats (intro-
duced in 1991), and Design Plus ¯ ats (intro-
duced in 1995). These have better designs
and ® nishes, such as coordina ted tiles and
sanitary ® xtures, and have design inputs from
private architects. There will also be attempts
to incorporate nature in landscaping designs.
The ` Politics of Quality’ : Managing Aspi-
rations
As Castells et al. (1990, p. 319) argue, the
success of public housing in Singapore was
important in establishing the government’ s
political legitimacy and dominance. This was
possible in the early years of Singapore’ s
independence because public housing pro-
vision was held as testimony to the newly
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elected government’ s commitment to better-
ing the material condition s of Singaporeans
(Chua, 1995, p. 131).
7
In later years, the tan-
gible blocks of ¯ ats became powerful sym-
bols of success, monuments that attest to the
HDB’ s achievements, a claim that is effec-
tively made by the government (Pugh, 1989,
p. 837; Chua, 1995, p. 139).
In attempting to provide and/or to facili-
tate quality housing in the 1990s, it may be
said that the government is attempting to
maintain its political legitimacy. The provi-
sions and schemes of the HDB in previous
decades no longer suf® ce. As Singapore de-
velops and standards of living improve , Sin-
gaporeans of the 1990s have developed
increasingly higher aspirations. This is most
clearly re¯ ected in the desire to own private
properties and cars, two extremely limited
commodities in the context of land-scarce
Singapore. In order to manage Singaporeans’
aspirations to own private property, the
government has therefore introduced the
executive condominium scheme (The Straits
Times, 31 August 1995) and has privatised
HUDC estates. New schemes have also been
introduced in which HDB ¯ ats are increas-
ingly provided with the amenities, designs
and ® ttings of private condom iniums. For
those who may ® nd it frustrating to remain in
their older housing estates while other Singa-
poreans proceed to realise their aspirations,
the upgrading programme was introduced to
help to ful® l their expectations. Apart from
improving the condition s in which they lived,
upgrading would also raise the value of their
HDB ¯ ats.
How successful are these measures likely
to be? Initial response to the proposal to
build executive condom iniums has been
lukewarm. Many Singaporeans expressed the
view that they would be paying two to two-
and-a-half times more for executive condo-
miniums than for HDB executive ¯ ats even
though the latter are one-sixth to nearly one-
half bigger. Yet, it must be noted that these
executive condom iniums are 15±20 per cent
cheaper than comparable private apartments
in similar locations (The Straits Times, 30
August 1995). For those who expressed in-
terest in the scheme, the prestige of living in
private property and the additional rec-
reational amenities are de® nite draws (The
Straits Times, 31 August 1995). Market ana-
lysts suggest that in the long term, executive
condom iniums will ª support private housing
prices by providing a cheaper entry-point
into the marketº (The Straits Times, 30 Au-
gust 1995). The privatisation of HUDC es-
tates appears to have been more
unequivoca lly welcomed, as more than the
requisite proportion of residents in Gillman
Heights and Pine Grove have agreed to pri-
vatise while residents in some other HUDC
estates have requested that their estates also
be privatised in the near future.
Upgrading has also received positive re-
sponse from those affected. The results of a
questionna ire survey conduc ted in late 1994
involving 100 randomly selected households
in Lorong Lew Lian, one of a batch of six
housing estates identi® ed for the demon-
stration phase upgrading in 1992, bears this
out.
Lorong Lew Lian consists of 8 blocks of
¯ ats with 906 households. It was beginning
to show signs of dilapidation after more than
15 years of existence and existing facilities
had become inadequate to meet the needs of
an increasing proportion of the elderly popu-
lation. In the attempt to provide the estate
with a new and distinct identity , the upgrad-
ing focused on three levels: precinct, block
and individual units. The aim was to create
an environment that would be both aesthetic
and functional. At the precinct level, the
design features included pavilions, a bird
viewing area, open plaza, galleries, pergolas,
barbecue pits, landscaped gardens, residents’
corner and covered walkways. At the block
level, the emphasis was on features such as a
new facË ade, sheltered entrance porch, im-
proved lifts, integrated ceiling and lift ® ttings
and ® nishes. The upgrading of the individual
units took the form of additional balcony
space and new aluminium window ® ttings,
¯ oor tiles for bathrooms, doors and water
closet appliances.
These improvements at the various levels
to enhance the estate underlie the overall
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objectives of the HDB’ s upgrading pro-
gramme: the idea is to create through the
precinct a living environment that is con-
ducive to forging an interactive and cohesive
community while block and ¯ at upgrading
are directed towards improving the housing
condition of residents. The ultimate aim is to
provide the estate with facilities and a living
environment that are comparable with those
found in the newer housing estates (HDB,
1991/92 ).
A great majority of those surveyed ex-
pressed satisfaction with the overall improve-
ments in the quality of their living
environment. About 90 per cent of the house-
hold heads interviewed said they were
pleased with the block facË ade design as well
as the ® xtures and ® nishes to their ¯ ats,
especially the additiona l balcony space. Al-
most 80 per cent expressed the view that the
provision of precinct facilities like the chil-
dren’ s playground, barbecue pits and resi-
dents’ corners had brought residents closer
together. It is more dif® cult to assess the
extent to which the new identity resulting
from the upgrading programme will be able
to halt the out¯ ow of the younger population
from the estate. Lorong Lew Lian is one of a
number of older estates to have suffered a
massive outward drift of its better-educated
and more af¯ uent younger population as they
upgraded to bigger and better-designed ¯ ats
in the newer new towns. At the time of the
survey, about four-® fths of Lorong Lew
Lian’ s household heads were over 40 years
old, while in the new towns, the heads are
predominantly in the 25±35 age-group. Re-
spondents’ responses to the question whether
they were contemplating a move to the new
towns now that the estate had been upgraded
indicated that of the 15 respondents in the
20±39 age category, only one was consider-
ing moving out because of growing family
size and improved ® nancial position . The
remaining 85 per cent of the heads in the
40-years and above age-group were abso-
lutely certain of wanting to stay on.
The ® ndings of the Lorong Lew Lian
study suggest that the residents are highly
satis® ed with their upgraded estate. This may
in part be due to the fact that the residents
were the most supportive of the upgrading
programme among the six estates identi® ed
for renewal, with 98 per cent of the house-
holds voting in favour of the project (House-
word, April 1992). Besides achieving its
objective of providing a better environment
and improved housing , the upgrading pro-
gramme has managed to retain the younger
segment of the population in the estate. It
remains to be seen whether in the forth-
coming general elections, Lorong Lew Lian
residents’ satisfaction with their improved
living condition s will be translated into a
resounding victory for the government.
While improving the quality of housing
has been made a hegemonic tool to gain
political legitimacy, it has also been wielded
directly as an object of political patronage.
This is not unique to the 1990s. In 1985, Mr
Teh Cheang Wan, then Minister for National
Development, expressed the view that those
who supported opposition parties would be
discriminated against in the delivery of some
public estate maintenance services. As he
pointed out,
This is a very practical political de-
cision¼ . It’ s fair from our party point of
view that we should give priority to the
constituencies with PAP {the ruling Peo-
ple’ s Action Party} MPs and give lower
priority to opposition MPs¼ . But they
will not be denied the service. (The Straits
Times, 22 March 1985)
When introducing the Town Council Act,
residents were also reminded that ª it would
be in {their} interest¼ to be very careful
whom they choose to be their representative
in Parliamentº (Ministry of National Devel-
opment, 1988, p. 15) because their chosen
representative would also run their town
councils, overseeing estate management and
improvements. A constituency with a less
able candidate would presumably not be able
to run the estate as well as a highly quali® ed
(PAP) candidate .
This appropriation of public housing and
its management for politica l purposes is evi-
dent in the context of the formal upgrading
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programme. In 1992, for example, Prime
Minister Goh Chok Tong made public the
government’ s intention to link the choice of
housing estates to be upgraded to the strength
of votes for the PAP in the general elections
(The Straits Times, 11 April 1992). In 1996,
Community Development Minister Abdullah
Tarmugi further outlined the three criteria
that the government would use in deciding
which HDB blocks would be upgraded: sur-
pluses, a good spread and support.
Speci® cally, upgrading could be carried out
only if the government continued to enjoy
budge t surpluses. The HDB would also try to
ensure a good geographical spread of the
precincts being upgraded. Finally, by way of
garnering support, he suggested that
¼ if you want your blocks and precincts to
be upgraded earlier, you know what to do
at the next election. The answer is in your
hands. (The Straits Times, 29 January
1996)
In the face of criticisms, and by way of
assurance, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong
asserted subsequently that all HDB residents
would bene ® t from upgrading. Objective cri-
teria such as the age of ¯ ats, their location
and the level of resident interest (as indicated
by votes in favour of upgrading) had been
and would continue to be used, and only
when two constituencies had HDB ¯ ats of
similar ages would the level of support for
the PAP government be used as a ` tie-
breaker’ (The Straits Times, 5 February
1996).
Conclusion
Singapore’ s public housing efforts have
moved from attempts to deal with the mass-
ive problems of overcrowding and unhy-
gienic conditions in the 1960s to a
commitment to provide quality housing . In
the present context, ` quality in the public
housing sector’ is measured by both physical
and social yardsticks. In the case of the
former, the aim is to ensure that housing
condition s achieve features of modernity,
with high accessibility to shared facilities
and amenities. The ability to provide spa-
cious quarters within the constraints of land-
scarce Singapore in the form of high-rise
estates also constitutes a measure of ` qual-
ity’ . The intention is also to create aesthetic
and distinctive environments, contribut ing to
a living environment characterised by ma-
terial comfort and convenience. In addition,
` quality ’ is also measured by the ability to
develop cohesive neighbourhoods in which
social bonds are strong.
In all of these, the HDB has largely been
successful, nowhere more apparent than
when the HDB won the Asia Management
Award in Development Management in
1995. Conferred by the Asian Institute of
Management, the award recognises the ex-
cellent achievements of Asian management.
In the award citation, the HDB is said to
have ª creat{ed} substantial positive impact
on target bene ® ciaries through innovative,
sustainable and effective managementº and
to have improved the quality of life of people
(The Straits Times, 17 October 1995).
Although the HDB has achieved much,
Singaporeans’ aspirations are also growing,
and so demand for high-quality housing has
increased. In other words, this emphasis on
quality is necessary because Singaporeans,
increasingly accustomed to good, basic pro-
visions, are hankering for better and more.
For some segments of the population, this
has translated into a demand for private
housing . For others, it has meant ever bigger
and/or better-designed HDB ¯ ats. These as-
pirations must be managed, particularly be-
cause in the context of Singapore, ownership
of property, particularly private property,
does not only stand for a desire for more
material comfort, it represents as well a
status symbol. Given such a scenario, the
authorities, while having achieved much, are
faced with the continuing challenge of hav-
ing to manage Singaporeans’ aspirations.
We have shown in the preceding sections
what efforts have been made to provide
` quality ’ housing through the public agency,
the HDB, in the 1990s. At the upper end of
the scale, attempts are being made to convert
HDB-managed HUDC housing into private
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property, and effort has been put into intro-
ducing HDB housing that will eventually
become private properties (executive condo-
miniums). These schemes however come at a
cost that may not be easily affordable by all.
For the majority of Singaporeans, therefore,
quality housing will take the shape of im-
proved designs for new ¯ ats and upgraded
old ¯ ats.
Given growing aspirations, the politica l
implications of such polic ies are likely to
become accentuated henceforth. The poten-
tial political gains are great, if these schemes
succeed in ful® lling aspirations. The govern-
ment is fully aware of this, and has turned
the situation around so that if Singaporeans
want to increase the likelihood of their aspi-
rations being ful® lled, they must ® rst give
politica l support. This is nowhere more ap-
parent than in the upgrading programme. As
indicated in 1992, the government intends to
use the programme as the centrepiece of its
electoral platform for the next two general
elections (due in 1996 and 2001) (The Straits
Times, 13 April 1992). The government in-
tends to make voters more responsible by
having them bear the consequences of their
decisions at the ballot box (The Straits
Times, 20 April 1992). This will become
signi® cant for the four opposition wardsÐ
Bukit Gombak, Hougang, Nee Soon Central
and Potong PasirÐ which will exceed 20
years after the 1996 elections. How they vote
may then have a bearing on whether they are
upgraded subsequently.
The politic isation of HDB upgrading has
not been without its critics. Concern has been
raised that the PAP should not use tax-
payers’ money to further its own politica l
cause (The Straits Times, 5 February 1996).
Furthermore, to tie votes to a single issueÐ
the housing programmeÐ is not necessarily
effective since they are more likely to be cast
based on a variety of issues. There is also the
potential that such politicisation would be
ultimately harmful to the nation, breeding a
`What can you give me if I vote for you?’
electorate. The government thus has a tight-
rope to walk. On the one hand, it will have to
manage, if not help to ful® l, the higher aspi-
rations and, indeed, expectations of Singa-
poreans, bearing the political costs if they
fail. On the other hand, if it chooses to
dangle polic ies designed to improve people’ s
living condition s as carrots, and suggests that
these policies will be put into action only if
they are given politica l support, it could
back® re. Despite having achieved much in
the arena of housing provision in the last
three decades, the provision of a quality
housing environment in the 1990s and be-
yond will nevertheless continue to pose a
major challenge.
Notes
1. The Singapore Improvement Trust was set
up in 1927 to supervis e urban improvement
and developm ent. It was only in the 1930s
that it venture d into public housing in recog-
nition of the shortage of housing for lower-
income groups. While the SIT attempted to
address the housing problem , its achieve-
ments were small in comparison with the
magnitude of the problem .
2. In 1974, the Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Corporati on (HUDC) was created as a
subsidia ry of the HDB to build ¯ ats that
would cater for the middle-in come group. Its
speci® c role will be discussed in more detail
in a later part of the paper.
3. The CPF is a compulsory national social
security savings schem e kept in trust by the
governm ent. All employers and employees
are obliged to contribu te to it.
4. Toa Payoh was the ® rst satellite new town
built by the HDB in the 1960s.
5. The HDB has set a limit on the total house-
hold incom e that would qualify a househo ld
for ownership of a HDB ¯ at. The ceiling has
been revised upwards through the years to
re¯ ect rising salaries and higher costs of
living.
6. Owners, however, do own their car park lots.
7. Singapore gained internal self-gov ernment in
1959. In 1963, it gained full indepen dence
from Britain as part of Malaya. The two
entities separate d in 1965 to form two inde-
pendent states, Malaysia and Singapore .
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